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In this paper, we will analyse the relationship between privatization of
a public firm and tax revenue for the domestic government in an inter-
national competition, with import tariffs. We consider a duopoly model
where a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm compete in the do-
mesticmarket, asCournot players. Furthermore, the domestic government
imposes a tariff to regulate an imported good, andmay have a higher pref-
erence for tariff revenue than for social welfare. We compute the outputs
at equilibrium and we show that privatization (i) will increase the profits
of both domestic and foreign firms; (ii) will increase the tariff imposed to
the imported good; and (iii) will decrease the domestic welfare. Further-
more, we demonstrate that a rise in the government’s preference for tariff
revenues raises the social welfare in both mixed and private models.
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privatization
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Introduction
Mixed oligopolies, where a public firm competes with private firms are
common in developed and developing countries. Public firms compete
against private firms in many industries, such as airlines, banking, elec-
tricity, steel, and so on.
Ferreira and Ferreira (2014) analysed the relationship between the pri-
vatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue
in a duopoly model, by assuming that the government payoff is given by
a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer
surplus. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) showed that privatization of the
public firm may improve social welfare. Pi, Yang, and Zhou (2013) and
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Ferreira and Ferreira (2016) investigated the economic impacts exerted
by privatization in amodel that considers environmental problems. They
showed that, when the residents’ environmental preference is introduced
to the public firm’s payoff function, privatization may increase the pub-
lic firm’s output, decrease the private firm’s output and has no effect on
social welfare. White (1996) studied effects of domestic production sub-
sidies in a mixed oligopoly market. Pal andWhite (1996) investigated the
effects of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies in a mar-
ket with foreign firms. In amixed duopoly,Matsumura andOgawa (2010)
analysed whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the
observable delay game. They showed that private leadership is more ro-
bust than public leadership. Some authors examine price-setting mixed
market models (see, for instance, Bárcena-Ruiz 2007 and Ohnishi 2011).
Many works on mixed oligopoly analysed domestic competitions.
However, more recent literature in this field of industrial organization
includes foreign private firms. The introduction of foreign firms affects,
or may affect the results, since the social welfare does not include the
producer surplus of the foreign firms (see Fjell and Pal 1996). Lee, Xu,
and Chen (2013) showed that the equilibrium degree of privatization de-
pends not only on the relative efficiency of the public firm, but also on
trade policy. Moreover, they also demonstrated that competitive privati-
zation with a tariff achieves a higher degree of privatization than without
a tariff.
In this paper, we analyse the effects of privatization in a domestic mar-
ket served by a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm, by as-
suming that the government imposes an import tariff. Furthermore, we
allow the government may prefer tariff revenue more than social welfare.
We show that increasing the government’s preference for tariff revenues
leads to reduction on the aggregate quantity in the mixed market, while
the opposite is true after privatization of the public firm. Furthermore, a
rise in government’s preference for tariff revenues raises domestic public
firm’s profit; but it lowers domestic privatized firm’s profit. Moreover, as
the government’s preference for tariff revenues increases, the social wel-
fare becomes higher in both mixed and private models.
The remained of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the mixed model in which the government may prefer tariff revenue to
the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In Section 3, we compute and
analyse the equilibrium outcome. Section 4 solves the privatized model.
In Section 5, we do a comparative static analysis. Section 6 compares the
two models. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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The Mixed Model
We consider an international mixed duopoly with one domestic public
firm Fd and one foreign private firm Fj. We assume that both firms pro-
duce a homogeneous good and the market demand is given by
p = 1 − qd − qf ,
where p is the price, qd is the quantity produced by the domestic public
firm and qf is the quantity produced by the foreign private firm. Both
firms have the same quadratic cost function
C(qi) =
q2i
2
, i = d, f .
Furthermore, we assume that the government of the domestic country
imposes a tariff t on imported goods.
So, each firm’s profit function is defined by
πd = (1 − qd − qf )qd −
q2d
2
,
πf = (1 − qd − qf )qd −
q2f
2
tqf .
The domestic public firm chooses its output that maximizes the sum
of consumer’s surplus and domestic producer surplus:
W = CS + PS =
1
2
(qd = qf )2 + πd.
The government’s payoff is given by
U =W + (1 + α)R,
where R = tqf and α is the parameter that represents the weight of the
government’s preference for tariff revenues. We consider α ≥ 0, i.e., the
government values tariff revenues Rmore than social welfareW.
The timing of the game is as follows:
• In the first stage, the government sets the import tariff t;
• In the second stage, each firm, independent and simultaneously,
chooses its quantity qi, i = d, f , knowing already the import tariff
imposed by the government.
Analysis of the Mixed Model
To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by back-
wards induction.
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So, we differentiate the functionW with respect to qd and the function
πf with respect to qf :
∂W
∂qd
= 1 − 2qd = 0,
∂πf
∂qf
= 1 − qd − 3qf − t = 0.
The above first order conditions yield the following results:
qMd =
1
2
, qMf =
1 − 2t
6
.
Thus, the government’s payoff function U can now be rewritten as
U =
19 + 8t − 20t2 − 12αt(2t − 1)
72
.
Maximizing the function U, with respect to t, we get
∂U
∂t
=
2 − 10t − 3α(4t − 1)
18
= 0,
which gives
tM =
3α + 2
2(6α + 5)
. (1)
By using (1), we get the following output level at equilibrium:
qMf =
α + 1
2(6α + 5)
(2)
Furthermore, the aggregate quantityQM in themarket, the firms’ prof-
its, consumer surplus, social welfare, tariff revenue and the government’s
payoff are given by:
QM =
7α + 6
2(6α + 5)
,
πMd =
4α + 3
8(6α + 5)
, πMf =
3(α + 1)2
8(6α + 5)2
,
CSM =
(7α + 6)2
(6α + 5)2
,
WM =
73α2 + 122α + 51
8(6α + 5)2
,
RM =
(α + 1)(3α + 2)
4(6α + 5)2
,
UM =
α2 + 14α + 11
8(6α + 5)
.
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The Privatized Duopoly
Now, let us consider the case where the public firm is privatized without
cost. So, the objective function of the privatized firm Fd is now its profit
πd = (α − qd − qf )qd − 1 12d
2
d. (3)
Utilizing the sameway of calculation as in the previous sections, we get
the following result (throughout the paper, we use the notation subscript
P to refer to privatized firm):
tP =
2(8α + 7)
48α + 41
,
qPd =
2(7α + 6)
48α + 41
, qPf =
6α + 5
48α + 41
,
πPd =
6(7α + 6)2
(48α + 41)2
, πPf =
3(6α + 5)2
2(48α + 41)2
,
CSP =
(20α + 17)2
2(48α + 41)2
,
WP =
988α2 + 1688α + 721
2(48α + 41)2
,
RP =
2(6α + 5)(8α + 7)
(48α + 41)2
,
UP =
(4α2 + 28α + 21
2(48α + 41)
.
Numerical Example
Here, we present an example that will help us to illustrate the results pre-
sented in the paper. Consider amarketwith the parameterα, representing
the weight of the government’s preference for tariff revenues, equal to 0.5.
Table 1 shows the results for the mixed and private markets.
Comparative Static Analysis
Now, we do a comparative static analysis on the results presented above.
In the mixed market, the import tariff imposed by the government is in-
creasing in the weight of the government’s preference for tariff revenues,
while it is decreasing when the market is served only by private firms:
∂tM
∂α
=
3
2(6α + 5)2
> 0,
∂tP
∂α
=
16
(48α + 41)2
< 0. (4)
Production of the foreign private firm is decreasing in the government’s
preference for tariff revenues, when it competes with a public firm, whose
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table 1 Results for Mixed and Private Markets
Mixed duopoly Private duopoly
tM = 0.438 tP = 0.338
qMd = 0.500 q
P
d = 0.292
qMf = 0.094 q
P
f = 0.123
QM = 0.594 QP = 0.415
πMd = 0.078 π
P
d = 0.128
πMf = 0.013 π
P
f = 0.023
CSM = 0.176 CSP = 0.086
WM = 0.254 WP = 0.214
RM = 0.021 RP = 0.042
UM = 0.285 UP = 0.277
production is constant; after privatization, the production of the domestic
privatized firm is decreasing and the production of the foreign private
firm is increasing; and the overall effect is that the aggregate quantity in
the mixed market is decreasing in the government’s preference for tariff
revenues, and it is increasing after privatization:
∂qMd
∂α
= 0,
∂qMf
∂α
= − 1
2(6α + 5)2
< 0,
∂qPd
∂α
= − 2
(48α + 41)2
< 0,
∂qPf
∂α
=
6
(48α + 41)2
> 0,
∂qM
∂α
= − 1
2(6α + 5)2
< 0,
∂qP
∂α
=
4
(48α + 41)2
> 0.
Furthermore, in the mixed market, domestic public firm’s profit in-
creases in the government’s preference for tariff revenues, while foreign
private firm’s profit decreases; After privatization, domestic privatized
firm’s profit decreases in the government’s preference for tariff revenues,
while foreign private firm’s profit increases:
∂πMd
∂α
=
1
4(6α + 5)2
> 0,
∂πMf
∂α
= − 3
4(6α + 5)3
< 0,
∂πPd
∂α
= − 12(7α + 6)
(48α + 41)3
< 0,
∂πPf
∂α
=
18(6α + 5)
(48α + 41)3
> 0.
Consumer surplus decreases in the government’s preference for tariff
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revenues, in the mixed competition, and it increases when both firms are
private:
∂CSM
∂α
= − 7α + 6
4(6α + 5)3
< 0,
∂CSP
∂α
=
4(20α + 17)
(48α + 41)3
> 0.
Now, we will do a comparative static analysis on the social welfare. We
conclude that social welfare decreases in the government’s preference for
tariff revenues, in both, mixed and private, models:
∂WM
∂α
= − α + 1
4(6α + 5)3
< 0,
∂WP
∂α
= − 4(α + 1)
(48α + 41)3
< 0.
Effects of Privatization
Comparing the payoff function of the government before and after pri-
vatization, we get
UM − UP = 48α
3 + 39α2 − 38α − 31
8(6α + 5)(48α + 41)
, (5)
which is positive for values of α < α0 and negative for α > α0, where
α0 ∈ (0.89, 0.90) and 48α30 + 39α20 − 38α0 − 31 = 0. Thus, we get the
proposition below.
proposition 1. In the duopoly model presented above, the govern-
ment privatizes the public firm just if it put a high weight on the tariff
revenues.
Comparing the other equilibrium outputs in both mixed and priva-
tized models, we get the following proposition that summarizes the ef-
fects of privatization.
proposition 2. In the duopoly model presented above,
(a) Privatization increases the value of the import tariff, the quantity
produced by the foreign firm, the profits of both firms and the import
tariff revenue;
(b) Privatization decreases the quantity produced by the domestic
firm, the aggregate quantity in the domestic market, the consumer
surplus and the social welfare.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied privatization and government preferences for
import tariff revenue in an international Cournot model. First, the gov-
ernment chooses the import tariff to maximize a weighted function of
social welfare and import tariff revenue. Second, observing the value of
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the import tariff, both domestic and foreign firms simultaneous and in-
dependently choose quantities. We presented the equilibrium outcomes
of the mixed duopoly and of the privatized duopoly.
By doing a comparative static analysis, we showed that as the prefer-
ence of the government for tariff revenue becomes large, the social welfare
decreases in both mixed and privatized market competitions.
Furthermore, we also analysed the effects of privatization, and we con-
cluded that privatization decreases social welfare.
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